State Council Security Committee of the State Council notified the 1.12 major coal dust explosion in Shenmu Lijiagou Coal Mine


State Council Security Committee of the State Council notified the 1.12 major coal dust explosion in Shenmu Lijiagou Coal Mine -State-Council-Security-Committee-of-the-State-Council-notified-the-1.12-major-coal-dust-explosion-in-Shenmu-Lijiagou-Coal-Mine

First, the basic situation of the accident

(1) “1·12” major coal dust explosion accident at Lijiagou Coal Mine of Shenmu Baiji Mining Co., Ltd., Shenmu City, Yulin City, Shaanxi Province.

On January 12, 2019, a coal dust explosion occurred at Lijiagou Coal Mine of Baiji Mining Company, Shenmu City, Yulin City, Shaanxi Province, killing 21 people. The mine is a private enterprise with a production capacity of 900,000 tons/year, which is a low gas mine. Coal dust has an explosion hazard.

Preliminary analysis, the mined area of ​​the 506 informal continuous mining face and the roof of the old empty area connected with it are large, and the compressed goaf gas forms a strong airflow, which is blown out from the roadway connected with the goaf. The coal dust deposited in the roadway is raised and the explosion concentration is reached. The non-explosion-proof four-wheel coal truck ignites the coal dust and generates a coal dust explosion. The main problems exposed by the accident are as follows: First, the illegal contracting, the mine will contract from the underground production and operation, maintenance and management of all systems between the underground mining face to the ground coal bunker to Shandong Lutai Holding Group Co., Ltd. The coal recovery and mine excavation project was contracted to Shenmu City Wuyuan Construction Engineering Co., Ltd., violating the relevant provisions of Article 8 of the State Council Special Provisions on Preventing Coal Mine Production Safety Accidents (State Council Order No. 446). Second, in violation of regulations, a continuous mining working face is arranged between the goaf of the fully mechanized mining face and the goaf of the old kiln, and the coal body between the mining area and the old kiln is opened. Thirdly, the 506 continuous mining work face hidden and disaster-causing factors are unclear. When the excavation is carried out, the first exploration and excavation are not carried out, and the tunneling is carried out blindly. After the old kiln is penetrated, the mining activity is still not stopped. Fourthly, in the coal mining face, the tunnel is arbitrarily opened to the outside, and the tunnel-type coal mining and short-wall working face are mixed and mixed, so as to excavate, explore and mix. Fifth, the 506 continuous mining face uses MA-free equipment and non-explosion-proof vehicles into the well. Sixth, the 506 continuous mining working face did not strictly implement the dust-proof and dust-reducing measures, and the coal dust accumulation in the roadway, working face, equipment and pipeline was serious. Seventh, it is not strictly enforced the inspection and registration system for entry and exit, and it is common for non-explosion-proof four-wheelers, forklifts and pickup trucks to enter the well. Eighth, safety training is in the form, and the workers in the well lack basic safety knowledge, and there is a phenomenon of carrying fireworks into the well and smoking. Nine is not implementing the “one shot and three inspections” system before the blasting. It is not equipped with a full-time tile inspector and is also served by the team leader. It is not equipped with a portable optical tile detector. Ten is the artificial modification of the monitoring system data after the accident.

(2) The “1·6” large roof accident of Dapu'an Coal Mine in Shizong County, Qujing City, Yunnan Province.

On January 6, 2019, a roof accident occurred in the Dapu'an Coal Mine in Shizong County, Qujing City, Yunnan Province, killing four people. After the accident, the mine reported the accident and verified it after the report was reported by the masses. The mine is a private enterprise, integrating technical transformation into mines, with a designed production capacity of 300,000 tons/year, managed by high gas mines.

Preliminary analysis, the mine +1800 meters horizontal floor transport lane returning wind uphill is the collapsed old lane, the roadway dip angle of 42 °, the coal seam is soft and the roadway top, help broken; maintenance personnel in the case of unreinforced support venture, coal The body fell, washed down the bracket, and buried the personnel. The main problems exposed by the accident are as follows: First, the design is not approved. The roadway maintenance point where the accident occurred is not a construction (reserved) roadway within the scope of the preliminary design approval of the resource integration technical transformation project. Second, the mining operation approval system was not strictly implemented, and the sealing of the +1800-meter horizontal floor transportation lane was carried out without authorization, and the inspection and registration were not carried out to the regulatory authorities; the accident was led by the class leader, the tile inspector, and the safety officer into the well. After that, the maintenance work is carried out without performing a safety inspection on the inspection work point. Third, the technical management of roadway maintenance work is chaotic. The reasonable support method is not selected according to the inclination angle of the roadway, the coal seam and the top floor, and the wood support is violated. Fourth, safety training and education were not in place, and some of the special operations personnel did not hold the certificate, and some of the employees were not trained to go down. Fifth, the safety management rules and regulations are ineffective. The registration system for personnel entering the wells is not strictly enforced. Some personnel do not register in the wells, do not carry personnel identification cards, and even let other people carry the identification card of the wind detector into the well to measure the wind and provide falsehood. data. The sixth is to deliberately report the accident. After the accident, the main person in charge of the mine did not report the accident in time, and arranged personnel to deliberately delete the information of the two miners in the personnel position monitoring system to conceal the accident; regardless of the safety of the miners participating in the rescue site, the mine guards were closed. Security monitoring system. Seventh, safety supervision is not in place. The mine supervisor did not strictly perform the duties of the mine supervision. At about 8:00 on January 7th, he learned that the accident was not reported in time after the accident occurred in the mine; the duty guard of the Shizong County Coal Mine Safety Monitoring System Dispatching Center found the Dapuan Coal Mine. In the case of safety monitoring system gas overrun alarm and data transmission interruption, the cause was not reported in time and the cause was identified.

(3) A large suffocation accident at the “12·28” of Yukeng Coal Mine in Yongding District, Longyan City, Fujian Province.

On December 28, 2018, a suffocation accident occurred in the west mining area of ​​the Yukeng Coal Mine in Yongdeng District, Longyan City, Fujian Province, causing 6 deaths. The mine has a production capacity of 90,000 tons/year, which is a low gas mine.

Preliminary analysis, the mine-100m section 43# west mining face cut-off upper mountain excavation face is arranged in the coal seam anticline axis, the tectonic stress is large, and the gas content is relatively high. The collapse of coal in the roadway caused harmful gases such as gas and carbon dioxide to flow out, causing workers to suffocate and die. The main problems exposed by the accident are as follows: First, long-term cross-border illegal mining, the longest straight line in the cross-border range is 900 meters, and the cross-border depth is 245 meters. The use of false seals, fake drawings and other hidden means to evade supervision. Second, security management is chaotic. The legal representative, mine manager and deputy mine manager of the mine are inconsistent with the actual situation, and they are under the escrow; safety inspection workers, winch drivers and other special operations personnel are not certified, and some mining workers are not trained in safety. . Third, the management of ventilation gas is chaotic. The level of -20 meters to -100 meters in the Xicai District is exploited by “shaving down the mountain”, long-term breeze, circulating wind, high temperature operation, and the use of non-mineral equipment and non-flame retardant air ducts. Fourth, the refusal to implement the shutdown order, the relevant departments of Yongding District issued the shutdown order three times, but the mine refused to implement, continue to organize production in violation of laws and regulations. The fifth is to deliberately report the accident. After the accident, the mine did not report the accident as required, organized the rescue itself, and transferred the remains of the victims. Sixth, the supervision of the relevant departments is not in place, and the illegal organization production behavior of the mine is not well investigated.

(IV) The “12·24” large gas explosion accident in Guanyu Coal Mine of Baota District, Yan'an City, Shaanxi Province.

On December 24, 2018, a gas explosion occurred in the Guanyu Coal Mine in Baota District, Hua'an Coal Industry Co., Ltd., Yan'an City, Shaanxi Province, killing five people. The mine is a private enterprise with a designed production capacity of 3 million tons per year. It is a low gas mine and the coal dust has an explosion hazard.

According to preliminary analysis, five workers of the mine shotcrete team illegally opened the fence and entered the blind lane without discharging and inspecting the gas. The non-explosion-proof mobile phone carried by the mine caused the gas explosion accumulated in the blind alley. The main problems exposed by the accident are as follows: First, illegal and contracted custody, sub-contracting, and subcontracting. Hualong Coal Industry has managed the underground coal mine production as a whole to Shenguang Company, which has not obtained the safety production license of coal mine enterprises; Shenguang Company also violated the regulations and subcontracted the underground mining face and the maintenance work of the wells as an independent project to Pingxiang Company and Hang'an Company. The company and Jinyuetai Company; Pingxiang Coal Mine Project Department (ie, the first team) will subcontract the project to 7 units (including the shotcrete team) according to different operation locations and processes. The daily work of each operation point is also arranged by the lowest level of the contractor, and each line is, there is no unified management. Second, ignoring the supervision and supervision instructions and resume production without authorization. Relevant departments found that the mine had illegal activities and accidents during the assault inspection of the mine. On December 20, a penalty was imposed for temporarily suspending the production safety permit and ordering the mine to stop production, but the mine resumed production without authorization. Third, the mine ventilation management was chaotic. The inner section of the east wing belt lane of the 501 panel was not closed in time. The workers removed the fence without authorization and entered the blind lane. Fourth, the construction organization management is chaotic. A set of local ventilation equipment in the 501 panel serves the two adjacent excavation working faces. It adopts the “stop one digging one” alternate excavation method. During the construction process, it stops repeatedly and stops the wind, and does not check and discharge the gas according to the regulations. Fifth, the system of inspecting and checking the vehicle was ineffective. 124 people in the accident did not carry the identification card into the well. The workers in the well carried non-explosion-proof mobile phones, and the non-explosion-proof vehicles on the ground entered the well at will. Sixth, the safety training system was not implemented, and employees' awareness of safety was weak. Three of the accident miners arrived at the mine on December 23, and did not enter the job safety training. On December 24, they entered the well. Seventh, the late report accident, the mine received a report of the underground accident at 9:50 on December 24, and reported to the relevant departments of the local government at 11:33.

Second, the relevant requirements

(1) The Shaanxi, Yunnan, and Fujian Provincial Safety Production Committees are urged to supervise and guide the local coal mine safety supervision bureau and relevant departments to seriously organize the accident investigation work, and to investigate the accident-responsible person according to the law. The main responsible person of the coal mine suspected of committing a crime shall start the execution connection mechanism as soon as possible and transfer it to the judicial organs for criminal responsibility according to law. The closing of the closure of the accident coal mine and the suspension of the shutdown. Mines that have been ordered to suspend production shall not resume production without the resettlement inspection and resumption of production by local government organizations. Local governments that decide to implement closed mines in accordance with the law must be shut down in accordance with the closing standards.

(2) Inviting the safety production committees of the coal-producing provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) to make inferences against the problems and lessons revealed by the above-mentioned accidents, strengthen the supervision of local territories, carry out special rectification of outstanding problems, crack down on all kinds of violations and regulations, and ensure coal mines. Safe Production.

All provincial-level security committee offices are requested to timely communicate this notification to all coal-producing city (prefecture) and county (district) people's governments within their respective jurisdictions; and the security committee offices at all levels are responsible for timely communicating this notification to all coal mines within their jurisdiction.

State Council Security Committee Office

January 29, 2019


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